Myth, Reality, and the Chinese Revolution (2007)

‘The "myths" of the Chinese Revolution were propaganda creations aimed at presenting an idealised past as the reality in order to facilitate a utopian future.’


The above quote makes a number of assumptions. First and most apparent is that the truth about episodes of the Chinese Revolution has been distorted and manipulated in order to portray the Revolution in a more positive light than it naturally would be. By describing these distortions as ‘creations’, the statement emphasizes its conviction that the truth has not only been altered, but replaced with a whole new ‘reality’. Furthermore, these mythical episodes have been deliberately crafted so that they might be used to promote political and socio-economic change which in turn would bring about an utopian society.

Although the statement seeks to expose parts of the Chinese Revolution as myth, it is nevertheless not particularly critical of the propaganda, almost justifying it as part of the revolutionary process which was aiming to improve Chinese society. In this way it presents those responsible for propagating the myths as a benign group, seeking to develop China, rather than a malignant one, seeking to conceal their mistakes, save face and consolidate their power.

Consequently, assessing the validity of the statement throws up an array of questions. What are these ‘myths’ and are they most accurately described as propaganda creations, or is there some substance to them? Did an idealised vision of the past contribute to an utopian development of the Revolution, and in what way? Was this the intended purpose of the ‘myths’ or were they designed to exonerate, glamorise and ultimately deify the Communist leadership? It is these questions that this discussion intends to answer.

The ‘idealised past’ of the Chinese Communist Party can be seen most clearly in accounts of The Long March and descriptions of the Yenan Way. These two episodes are the founding stories of the Chinese Revolution and subsequently the People’s Republic, and the Party’s apparent triumphs in the face of adversity served to vindicate their methods and legitimise their cause. The Yenan Way was of special significance to the Revolution as it provided a model from which to draw later policy both on a local and national level. This will be discussed further in the body of the text, but the point made here is that the ‘myths’ surrounding these two experiences were of particular consequence to the Revolution and thus are crucial to any discussion examining the impact of an idealised past on its development. That is not to deny the significance or propagation of myths later in China’s history, such as those relating to the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution, but on account of constraints of time and space it must be the founding ‘myths’ that are closely examined here.

In 1937 Edgar Snow’s first edition of Red Star over China was published. Although he had not participated in the Long March, he included a detailed account of it in the book, as it was related to him by Mao and other members of the Communist leadership. In his account the Red Army bravely fought its way out of a Kuomintang blockade around Jiangxi province in 1934, and made a journey of more than 6,000 miles to Shaanxi province in just over a year. During this time they were able to implement socialist policy in the areas they occupied and mobilize the peasantry, despite frequently coming under attack and encountering severe environmental difficulties. Mao emerged as an inspirational leader and brilliant tactician.[1]

Snow’s version was received by a predominantly uninformed international audience, increasingly wary of the fascist and imperialist aspirations of the axis powers, and his flattering background story of a popular movement who now appeared to be heroically struggling against Japanese incursion was widely accepted. As the supposedly impartial report of an American journalist, the Party initially encouraged the circulation of his book in China so that the account would gain currency.

The acceptance of Snow’s work achieved three things for the Communists: First, they were represented as a genuine popular movement, inspired by égalité and brotherhood. Secondly, by overcoming incredible odds they had proved themselves more virtuous and more capable than their Kuomintang adversaries. Thirdly, Snow depicted the Communist leadership, particularly Mao and Zhou Enlai, as a benign group of inspirational revolutionaries, committed to improving the lot of the common man.

More recent research has argued that such an understanding of the Long March is not entirely accurate. Jung Chang is vituperative in her opposition to the Party’s official line on the Long March: The Red Army was squandered needlessly as Mao wrestled with the leadership for dominance, its numbers were diminished by desertion more than casualties as disillusioned peasants fled, and most of those who finally arrived in Shaanxi had not marched all the way from Jianxi.[2] Unfortunately aspects of Chang’s work are clearly questionable. She claims, for example, that the disastrous battle of Tucheng took place on Mao’s insistence as he made a bid for military control, but in his review of Mao: The Unknown Story, Alfred Chan shows that an important source she cites actually states it was the collective decision of Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Liu Bocheng.[3] Sun Shuyun is more equivocal in her approach; true, the Communists were guilty of forced conscription, experienced widespread desertion, and at times suffered from Mao’s interference,[4] but many amongst them were convinced by their cause, making incredible sacrifices and experiencing real comradeship as they made their way north.[5]

From the research of Chang, Sun Shuyun and Harrison Salisbury it is evident that the Long March as told by Snow and the CCP is at least in part fallacious. Mass desertions took place and there was a chaotic and catastrophic aspect to the whole event which the official line attempts to cover up.[6] Mao can be criticised for his strategic and tactical errors as much as he might be praised for his successes, and if he did not deliberately sacrifice troops for his personal goals he was far too frequently negligent. The Party appear to have exaggerated moments of questionable significance to the point that they have become seen as historic turning-points. Yet on the other hand the Red Army achieved an incredible endurance feat, spurred on in part by their socialist beliefs.[7] It is this basic, undeniable fact that the Communist Party were able to embellish until the essentially unglamorous truth became just a small part of the dramatic, glorious and mythical new ‘reality’. In essence, there is a basis of substance to the myth of the Long March, but it has been subject to omissions and exaggeration of such magnitude that it can no longer be recognised in the context of the myth.

More difficult to ascertain are the elements of truth and fallacy in the history of the Yenan Way. Writing in 1995, Mark Selden correctly identifies the contemporary appraisals of international authors within the context of their ‘growing antipathy and disillusionment with the corruption, brutality and malfeasance of the Guomindang’.[8] Chinese Communism must have appeared all the more egalitarian and democratic relative to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Accordingly, authors like Harrison Forman began to relate the reforms of the Communists in their northern bases in a very positive fashion.[9] Selden’s own work of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s proved instrumental in persuading scholarly opinion Communist actions in the northern base areas were mainly benevolent.[10] Lindsay, Schran and Wales would later concur in large part.[11]

From these authors emerged a more complex ‘myth’ than that of The Long March; the validation of the Yenan Way through acceptance of an integrated set of smaller ‘myths’. Simultaneously, within China the mystification of the Yenan Way was continuous, and conducted with even greater intensity. For the purpose of this short discussion the Yenan experience can be reduced to three pivotal ‘myths’ sustaining the overall ‘myth’ of benevolent and successful reform. These were as follows:

1) That the ‘rectification’ campaign was in fact a primarily educational experience, designed to integrate and organise cadres so that they might better accommodate and apply Marxist and socialist ideas to China’s unique problems.
2) That Party-led socio-economic reforms, including rent/tax reduction, the formation of co-operative movements and dependent aid programs were able to rehabilitate a ‘barren liability’ into a viable, self-sustaining economy.
3) That throughout the Yenan period the ‘Mass line’ was developed; encouraging democratic participation at all levels, communicating ideas from the grass-roots cadres to the leadership and vice-versa, and planning policy around the concerns and struggles of the masses.

New information from China regarding the Party’s role in the Great Leap famine, the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square has encouraged a more sceptical analysis of the Party’s history. David E. Apter, Jung Chang and Mark Selden have reinterpreted the ‘rectification’ campaign as a measure more authoritarian than educational.[12] The incarceration and eventual execution of Wang Shi-wei casts a campaign already described as ‘psychological struggle’ in an increasingly negative light. By insisting on the study of a narrow body of work, a large part of which was penned by Mao, rectification not only encouraged admiration of Mao’s work, but also demanded adherence to the Maoist line. Wang’s fate and Chang’s description of the plight of detainees suggest that the campaign was far more than a rigorous form of education; it intended to crush independent thought through fear and intimidation, thus pre-empting challenges to the Party and its leadership.

Chen Yung-fa effectively demolishes the notion of economic self-reliance in the border region by detailing the Communists’ heavy reliance on the opium trade during war-time.[13] This is hardly surprising, considering the barren landscape and ‘backwards’ population, it would have been nothing short of a miracle for the Communists to effect a legitimate economic turn-around in the eight years between 1937 and 1945. Yet this idea was and is claimed, and believed by many. The incredible success attributed to socio-economic reforms in the Yenan period demonstrated the correctness of Chinese Communism and significantly enhanced its attractiveness to the rest of the nation.

Although the base area’s reliance on the opium trade was considerable, and illustrated by economic stagnation following its cessation, it would be foolish to dismiss the impact of socio-economic reform and the progress it represented. Land distribution and the collectivisation of agriculture not only revitalised agriculture in the region but also gave the peasantry increased incentive, both to work their land and fight for it, and massively increased the appeal of Communism to the politically unenlightened.

Underpinning the educational and economic ‘struggle’ was Mao’s innovative conception of the ‘Mass line’. Although this has increasingly been interpreted as an authoritarian attempt to reinforce Party influence at all strata of society, that may be seen as an intentional side effect, which might be considered in a more positive way if not for the aggressive nature of the ‘rectification’ campaign it corresponded with. The Party represented the only tool with which to mobilize popular political consciousness and so cadres should be present at all levels of society to encourage this. Without this mobilization there would be no ideas from the grass-roots to take up in central government, and no communication between the two. ‘To the villages’ made the mass line a reality, but it failed to provide correct policy, as was made horribly clear by the Great Leap famine, probably because the climate of fear prevented early failures being adequately reported up the chain.

Just as in the case of The Long March, the uncomfortable realities of the Yenan Way have been distorted into a more ideal representation, only recently questioned. By portraying Yenan as an unqualified success the CCP sought to dismiss doubts as to the viability of Communism and replace apprehension about its leaders with admiration. Sweeping away these doubts was entirely necessary, as Communism’s reliance on unity necessitates widespread belief in the collective system.

In conclusion, it is fair to regard the CCP’s version of the two founding stories as largely propagated, but not entirely mythical, as they do have a foundation in reality. By limiting access to negative sources and making those that would reflect positively readily available they succeeded in creating an idealised ‘reality’ upon which they were able to found a nation. Had the harsh realities of the Revolution been exposed at an earlier time it would have been more difficult to attain popular support. Allocating the peasantry an increased role in society and then grandly espousing the fruits of that labour gave them a new interest in contributing to society, and pride at doing so, as Sun Shuyun finds.[14]

Still, the flaws in the system that the myths hide were to place impassable barriers in the way of the development of an utopian society. The perceived correctness of the system, as crafted by the Communist leaders, created the myth of an infallible leadership. Unquestioned obedience to the Maoist line would lead to the Great Leap famine as Mao insisted on agricultural techniques that flew in the face of science and caused widespread crop failures. The attempt to maintain the infallible image prolonged the suffering and resulted in what has been estimated as around 30 million deaths. Later, the virtual deification of Mao allowed for a fanaticism which culminated in the violent turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

Chang argues that the whole revolutionary process was manipulated by Mao so that it might exalt him and award him a preponderance of power.[15] Evidently he did struggle to gain his position and both the system he implemented and the myths it propagated helped keep him there. But whether this was done out of a stubborn desire to shape the Revolution as he thought best or merely to satisfy a personal lust for power is a question only Mao could have answered. The persuasive nature of his incredibly detailed ideology provides strong support for the former conclusion; this is undoubtedly why Chang omits it from her book.

Bibliography

Alfred Chan, ‘Mao: A Super Monster?’- Pacific Affairs: Volume 79, No.1

Jung Chang & Jon Halliday – Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Vintage Books, 2007)

Harrison Forman – Report from Red China (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1946)

Michael Lindsay – The Unknown War: North China (New York: Two Continents, 1977)

Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.) – New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1995)

Harrison Salisbury – The Long March: The Untold Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987)

Peter Schran – Guerrilla Economy: The development of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976)

Mark Selden – The Yenan way in revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)

Mark Selden – ‘Yan’an Communism Reconsidered’ – Modern China January 1995

Sun Shuyun – The Long March (London: HarperCollins, 2006)

Edgar Snow – Red Star Over China: The Rise of the Red Army (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937)

Nym Wales – Inside Red China (New York: De Capo Press, 1977)

[1] Edgar Snow – Red Star Over China: The Rise of the Red Army (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937)
[2] Jung Chang & Jon Halliday – Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Vintage Books, 2007)
[3] Alfred Chan, ‘Mao: A Super Monster?’- Pacific Affairs: Volume 79, No.1 p.101
[4] Sun Shuyun – The Long March (London: HarperCollins, 2006) p.32; p.74
[5] ibid. p.107; p.149; p.169
[6] Harrison Salisbury – The Long March: The Untold Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987)
[7] Sun Shuyun – The Long March
[8] Mark Selden – ‘Yan’an Communism Reconsidered’ – Modern China January 1995 p.12
[9] Harrison Forman – Report from Red China (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1946)
[10] Mark Selden – The Yenan way in revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)
[11] Michael Lindsay – The Unknown War: North China (New York: Two Continents, 1977); Peter Schran – Guerrilla Economy: The development of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976); Nym Wales – Inside Red China (New York: De Capo Press, 1977)
[12] David E. Apter, ‘Discourse as Power: Yan’an and the Chinese Revolution’ in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.) – New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Jung Chang & Jon Halliday – Mao: The Unknown Story; Mark Selden – ‘Yan’an Communism Reconsidered’ – Modern China January 1995
[13] Chen Yungfa, ‘The blooming poppy under the red sun: the Yan’an Way and the opium trade’ in Saich, Tony & Van de Ven, Hans (eds.) – New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1995)
[14] Sun Shuyun – The Long March
[15] Jung Chang & Jon Halliday – Mao: The Unknown Story